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ABSTRACT 
 The challenging number is used for the detection of Spoofing attack. The IP Spoofing is considered to be 
one of the potentially brutal attack which acts as a tool for the DDoS attack which is considered to be a 
major threat among security problems in today’s internet. These kinds of attack are extremely severe. 
They bring down business of company drastically. DDoS attack can easily exhaust the computing and 
communication resources of its victim within a short period of time. There are attacks exploiting some 
vulnerability or implementation bug in the software implementation of a service to bring that down and 
some attacks will use all the available resources at the target machine. This deals on attacks that 
consume all the bandwidth available to the victim machine. While concentrating on the bandwidth attack 
the TCP SYN flood is the more prominent attack. TCP/IP protocol suite is the most widely used protocol 
suite for data communication. The TCP SYN flood works by exhausting the TCP connection queue of the 
host and thus denying legitimate connection request. There are various methods used to detect and 
prevent this attack, one of which is to block the packet based on SYN flag count from the same IP address. 
This kind of prevention methods becomes unsuitable when the attackers use the Spoofed IP address. The 
SYN spoofing becomes a major tool the TCP SYN flooding. For the prevention of this kind of attacks, the 
TCP specific probing is used in the proposed scheme where the client is requested challenging number 
while sending the ACK in the three way hand shake. This is very useful to find the Spoofed IP 
Packets/TCP SYN flood and preventing them. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
The SYN flood attack exploits a vulnerability of the TCP three-way handshake, namely, that a 
server needs to allocate a large data structure for any incoming SYN packet regardless of its 
authenticity. During SYN flood attacks, the attacker sends SYN packets with source IP 
addresses that do not exist or are not in use. This kind of flooding the SYN packet by spoofing 
their identity is SYN spoofing. During the three-way handshake, when the server puts the 
request information into the memory stack, it will wait for the confirmation from the client that 
sends the request. While the request is waiting to be confirmed, it will remain in the memory 
stack. Since the source IP addresses used in SYN flood attacks can be nonexistent, the server 
will not receive confirmation packets for requests created by the SYN flood attack. Each half-
open connection will remain on the memory stack until it times out, it will retransmit the SYN-
ACK 5 times, doubling the time-out value after each retransmission. The initial time-out value 
is 3 seconds, so retries are attempted at 3, 6, 12, 24, and 48 seconds. More and more requests 
will accumulate and fill up the memory stack. Therefore, no new request, including legitimate 
requests, can be processed and the services of the system are disabled. Generally, the space for 
the memory stack allocated by the operating system is small, and even a small scale SYN flood 
attack can be disruptive. On the other hand, SYN floods can be also launched from 
compromised machines using spoofed IP address / genuine source IP addresses given these 
compromised machines using are configured to ignore the SYN/ACK packets from the target. 
 
2.  IP Spoofing Introduction 
The attackers to hide or mask their true use the IP spoofing as a tool. IP spoofing is one of the 
most common forms of on-line camouflage. In IP spoofing, an attacker gains unauthorized 
access to a computer or a network by making it appear that a malicious message has come from 
a trusted machine by “spoofing” the IP address of that machine.  
2.1. The IP Spoofing Techniques 
The SYN flood attack exploits a vulnerability of the TCP three-way handshake, namely, that a 
server needs to allocate a large data structure for any incoming SYN packet regardless of its 
authenticity. During SYN flood attacks, the attacker sends SYN packets with source IP 
addresses that do not exist or are not in use. During the three-way handshake, when the server 
puts the request information into the memory stack, it will wait for the confirmation from the 
client that sends the request. While the request is waiting to be confirmed, it will remain in the 
memory stack. Since the source IP addresses used in SYN flood attacks can be nonexistent, the 
server will not receive confirmation packets for requests created by the SYN flood attack. Each 
half-open connection will remain on the memory stack until it times out, it will retransmit the 
SYN-ACK 5 times, doubling the time-out value after each retransmission. The initial time-out 
value is 3 seconds, so retries are attempted at 3, 6, 12, 24, and 48 seconds. More and more 
requests will accumulate and fill up the memory stack. Therefore, no new request, including 
legitimate requests, can be processed and the services of the system are disabled. Generally, the 
space for the memory stack allocated by the operating system is small, and even a small scale 
SYN flood attack can be disruptive. On the other hand, SYN floods can be also launched from 
compromised machines using spoofed IP address / genuine source IP addresses given these 
compromised machines using are configured to ignore the SYN/ACK packets from the target. 
 
2.2. IP Spoofing Today 
From the results of the Spoofed Project [MIT Advanced Network Architecture Group 2007; 
Beverly and Bauer 2005] it is concluded that IP Spoofing continues to be a mammoth problem 
in today internet world. It is still a prospective tool used by malicious users for attack and 
misdirection. With existence of ingress/egress filters it may be concluded that attackers not able 
to spoof many addresses. 
 
2.3. Botnets 
A botnet is a collection of software agents, or robots, it is the malicious software Controlled 
using IRC bots. With the increase in the popularity of botnets, it is believe attackers no longer 
need to use IP spoofing. In fact, when considering botnets, IP spoofing remains a problem for 
defenders and an asset for attackers. In some botnet-based attacks, such as a DNS DDoS 
amplification attack, IP spoofing is vital to the attack’s success. Even if botnets did not use IP 
spoofing, the threat of IP spoofing would still exist.  
3.  Related Works 
The methods used for preventing TCP SYN flood is done by the following way using the server 
as the detector of the attack and the local router of the attacker is used to prevent the attack. To 
establish the TCP connection with the server, every client should send the SYN signal and have 
to respond the SYN/ACK signal with the ACK signal. To identify the attack, the SYN request 
sent by the client is stored in the server data table (database) until the acknowledgement from 
the client received by the server for the SYN ACK signal. The client information stored in the 
table is the IP address and the SYN count. If the count (number of SYN request sent by the 
attacker without the ACK signal to establish the connection) in the table exceeds the threshold 
limit, the victim intimate the details of the attack to its local router and it will be sent to the local 
router of the attacker to drop all the packets from the respective node. If suppose the local router 
compromise with the attacking node, that router is also prevented from throwing the packet. 
 
OS Fingerprinting [13] can detect spoofing packets if the spoofed source can be actively 
fingerprinted. The resulting active fingerprint is different from the passively deployed 
fingerprint then it is considered to be the spoofing packet. Even then, results can be complicated 
by a firewall between the target and the spoofed source, if the firewall filters the fingerprinting 
probes, or alters the responses. Fingerprinting is not reliable enough to depend on. 
 
Hop-Count Filtering (HCF) [10] observes the hop-count of packets arriving at a given 
host/server. During normal times measurement is made where, HCF creates a mapping of IP 
addresses to hop counts. Then, if an attacker sends a spoofing packet to the host; it is likely the 
hop-count of the packet will not match the expected hop-count for packets from the spoofed 
source address. Because legitimate hop-counts may change due to routing changes, strictly 
filtering all packets that do not match would lead to false positives. In order to minimize false 
positives, HCF only begins filtering traffic if some threshold amount of packets does not match 
their expected hop counts. 
 
 The method used to prevent the opening of connections to spoofed source addresses is SYN 
cookies [11]. When a server uses SYN cookies it does not allocate resources to a connection 
until the 3-way TCP handshake completes. First the server sends a SYN + ACK packet with a 
specially encoded initial sequence number, or cookie, that includes a hash of the TCP headers 
from the client’s initial SYN packet, a timestamp, and the client’s Maximum Segment Size 
(MSS). Then when it receives the client’s response, the server can check the sequence number 
and create the necessary state only if the client’s sequence number is the cookie value plus one. 
Because the cookie uses a hash involving the server’s secret key, attackers should not 
be able to guess the correct cookie values. However, because of performance concerns and some 
incompatibilities with TCP extensions, such as large windows, operating systems generally do 
not activate the SYN cookie mechanism until the host’s SYN queue fills up. An attacker 
sending spoofing traffic at a low rate may avoid triggering the SYN cookie mechanism. 
Administrators may be able to forcibly enable SYN cookies for all connections, but should be 
aware of the side effects. 
 
Another mechanism used for IP Spoofing prevention is using IP puzzles [12]. It provides active 
defense against spoofing. Here the server sends an IP puzzle to a client, and then the client 
needs to “solve” the puzzle by performing some computational task. Only after the server 
receives the puzzle solution from the client will the server allow the client to connect. It is 
prohibitively expensive for malicious hosts to send large numbers of packets as a side effect it is 
preventing attackers from successfully sending spoofing packets. Since the IP puzzle would be 
sent to the listed source and not the attacker, an attacker could not send a puzzle solution, thus 
preventing the attacker from spoofing. 
 
4. CNoA using TCP Probing 
CNoA method is used for the mitigation of TCP SYN flood with IP spoofing. Here the simple 
TCP handshake is vulnerable to prevent attackers from spoofing TCP packet, since attackers 
may be able to predict TCP sequence numbers. TCP-specific probes intelligently craft /append 
TCP acknowledgment messages to add another layer of protection. Since the sender of spoofing 
packets is often unable to see any replies, a recipient host can send acknowledgments that 
should reply with the challenging number, and then observe whether or not the supposed source 
responds correctly. If the supposed source does not respond with correct challenging number in 
acknowledgment packet, the recipient host considers the packet’s source to be spoofed. 
  
The recording of the TCP handshake is the key aspect in this method. The TCP 
acknowledgment message sends along with the SYN+ACK packet send from the victim server 
which undergoes the IP Spoofing for the TCP SYN flooding. If the packet is responded with 
correct challenging number the packet is not spoofed. 
 
 
 
 Figure . 1. .TCP SYN flood detection model using CNoA 
 
From the (Figure 1) we can see the CNoA method gives a very good picture whether the TCP 
packet received is spoofed or not. Based on the detection the packet is dropped or accepted. 
Initially the server receives the TCP packet with SYN flag in the packet so the protocol analyzer 
detect it as TCP protocol and send the client with the TCP Acknowledgement if the packet does 
not come from the spoofed IP address then the client reply with correct Challenging number 
based on this reply the learning/recording packet record this and send it to the detector. Based 
on the reply from the client the packet is dropped or accepted. 
 
This is a host-based architecture and it is developed using TCP Probing .Here the TCP probe is 
used to send the specification to the client trying to establish a new connection with the server. 
The decision is taken based on the reply from the client. CNoA is used to send the Challenging 
number when the client trying to establish a new connection with the server. The Specification 
contains the TCP probe which contains Challenging number that should make the client to 
send the same challenging number. The Protocol analyzer analyses the packet whether it is the 
TCP packet. The Packet Capture engine is used to record the packet used in the TCP handshake 
and it is useful in verifying the specification given by the TCP Probe. The Decider based on the 
information available (i.e.) it follows the Specification while replying back to the server, based 
on this packet accepted or rejected . The information of dropped packet is logged in the History 
logger. 
 
5. Algorithm 
 
if SYN packet from client IP then  
{  
     send SYN+ ACK+ Challenging Number from server  
   
      if ACK + Challenging Number then  
      {  
           TCP Connection Established  
       }  
       else  
          {  
               Decision (History Logger)  
          }  
   }  
 
Figure. 2. TCP SYN Spoofing detection algorithm using CNoA 
 
Figure. 3. TCP Three way handshake in normal scenario 
 
The above diagram represents the TCP Connection establishment where the TCP Three way 
handshake takes place. Here this protocol have the risk of TCP SYN flooding where the SYN 
packets are flooded continuously makes it’s a Denial of service attack by consuming the 
bandwidth of the network. It is made worse by SYN spoofing i.e. changing the identity of the 
attacker. It becomes impossible to prevent and attack from the spoofed source. 
 
 
 
Figure. 4. TCP Three way handshake connection established using CNoA method 
The CNoA method is used in the TCP Three way handshake. The server generators the 
Challenging number which is send along with the SYN+ACK i.e.  (SYN +ACK+ Challenging 
number) for which the clients as to reply the ACK with the challenging number i.e. (ACK+ 
Challenging number) send by the server. Here the server verifies the challenging number if it 
matches the connection is established. If the challenging number does not match or it doesn’t 
send the replay packet connection is not established. 
 
5. Test Cases 
The attack module is done from the Blade Server and the Storage Server run the prevention of 
the flooding attack. We are using two different systems for testing the client and the server 
program respectively. 
 
 
 
 
 
Table. 1. Attack, detection and prevention model of CNoA method 
 
 IPv4 IPv6 
Attack TCP SYN flooding with SYN 
Spoofing 
TCP SYN flooding with SYN 
Spoofing 
Detection  A challenging number for 
connection establishment 
A challenging number for 
connection establishment 
Prevention Add the IP address in black 
list  
Add the IP address in black 
list 
 
Case 1: TCP Connection Establishment Using IPv6 
 The client establishes connection with the server using 3-way handshake with IPv6 
global address. The server generates the challenging number to send to the client while 
establishing the connection with the server in the TCP three way handshakes. 
 
 
Figure.  5. 1.  Connection Establishment in the Client 
 
Figure.  5. 2. Connection Establishment in the Server 
Using the challenging number generated by the server the client establishes connection with the 
server. 
 
Case 2: TCP IP Spoofing Detection and Prevention Using IPv6 
 The attacker tries to establish connection with the server. The server checks the ACK 
packet sent by the client to find out if it has agreed upon the challenging number that it has send 
to the client.  It establishes the connection only if it had satisfies the above condition. Otherwise, 
it terminates the connection. 
 
Figure. 6. 1.  SYN  Spoofing attack used for TCP SYN Flooding 
 
 
Figure. 6. 2.  SYN Spoofing Detection and Prevention method using the CNoA 
  
Case 3:  TCP SYN Flooding Attack Using IPv4 
 The server is flooded with SYN packet from the attacker using the IPv4 address.  
 
 
Figure. 7. 1.  TCP SYN Flooding Attack using IPv4 address 
 
Figure. 7. 2.  TCP SYN Flood Attack Prevention for IPv4 address  
 
The CNoA method finds the spoofed Packet and drop the packet based on the speciation given 
in the acknowledgement. Here the comparison is made between the normal flow of packet with 
spoofed IP and the No. of spoofed packet detected using the CNoA. The attack is done on the 
blades servers and storage server maintains the challenging number method finds and detects 
the spoofed IP address and also drops the spoofed packets. 
          
 
Figure. 8. Comparison of spoofed packet in normal flow and the spoofed packet detected using CNoA method 
 
 
The CNoA method finds the spoofed Packet and drop the packet based on the speciation given 
in the acknowledgement. Here the comparison is made between the normal flow of packet with 
spoofed IP and the No. of spoofed packet detected using the CNoA method. 
 
           
Figure. 9. Comparison of various IP Spoofing methods with CNoA method 
Figure. 9. The TCP/IP Probe seems to have better efficiency with less overhead as compared to 
other methods of IP Spoofing prevention for the purpose of DDoS attack protection. 
6. CONCLUSIONS 
The CNoA method is very much useful in detecting SYN Spoofing and prevention of the TCP 
SYN flooding attack. The TCP SYN flooding which proves to be unpreventable by spoofing 
their identity is mitigated by using this method. Here the computational overhead of appending 
the challenging number during the connection establishment is minimized. 
The solution is given in the server-level i.e. host based solution is only given. The spoofed 
packets are to found in the router itself so that the bandwidth consumed to transfer the malicious 
data from source to destination can be avoided. 
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